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ABSTRACT. Iqaluit is unique among Canadian Arctic communities in that it originated not from a commercial venture, such as
mining or the fur trade, or as a government administrative centre, but as a Second World War military airfield. This airfield, though
never fully used for its intended purpose as a refueling base for short-range military aircraft en route from America to Great Britain,
is the cornerstone of the city of Iqaluit. It opened the region to development during the postwar years. As a result, Iqaluit became
a key transportation and communication hub for the eastern Arctic and, ultimately, the capital city of the new territory of Nunavut.
This survey of Iqaluit’s wartime origins and subsequent development focuses on four topics. The first is the pre-war and wartime
effort to establish an air route from North America to Europe via the Arctic; the second, the world events that precipitated
construction of a series of northern airfields, including Crystal Two, that would form the links in the Crimson Air Route. The third
is the importance of the Crystal Two airfield for the postwar development of Iqaluit, and the final focus is on the resourceful
individuals who pulled it all together, overcoming a myriad of apparently insurmountable obstacles to complete their mission.
Key words: Crimson Route, Crowell, Crystal Two, Forbes, Frobisher Bay, Hubbard, Iqaluit, Roosevelt, Second World War,
United States Army Air Forces, U-boat
RÉSUMÉ. Iqaluit est unique en son genre au Canada en ce qu’elle n’a pas vu le jour à la suite d’une entreprise commerciale, comme
l’exploitation minière ou la traite des fourrures, ou encore en tant que centre de l’administration gouvernementale, mais comme
terrain d’aviation militaire durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Bien qu’il n’ait jamais servi complètement son but prévu de base
de ravitaillement en carburant pour les avions militaires à court rayon d’action volant entre l’Amérique et la Grande-Bretagne,
ce terrain d’aviation est la pierre angulaire de la ville d’Iqaluit. Il a ouvert la région au développement durant les années de l’après-
guerre, faisant ainsi d’Iqaluit une plaque tournante majeure du transport et des communications dans l’Arctique oriental et, en fin
de compte, la capitale du nouveau territoire du Nunavut. Cette étude sur les origines d’Iqaluit durant la guerre et son évolution
subséquente se concentre sur quatre grands éléments. Le premier est l’effort avant et durant la guerre visant à établir une route
aérienne entre l’Amérique du Nord et l’Europe via l’Arctique; le second, les événements mondiaux qui précipitèrent la
construction d’une série de terrains d’aviation dans le Nord – y compris Crystal Two – qui allaient créer les relais de la route
aérienne Crimson. Le troisième est l’importance du terrain d’aviation Crystal Two pour le développement d’Iqaluit après la guerre,
et le dernier concerne les individus ingénieux qui ont mené à bien le projet, tout en étant confrontés à une myriade d’obstacles
apparemment insurmontables pour accomplir leur mission.
Mots clés: route Crimson, Crowell, Crystal Two, Forbes, Frobisher Bay, Hubbard, Iqaluit, Roosevelt, Deuxième Guerre mondiale,
aviation militaire des États-Unis, sous-marin allemand
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INTRODUCTION
Fifty-six kilometres (28 nautical miles) from the Arctic
community of Iqaluit lie the decaying remains of Crystal
Two, a former United States Army Air Forces (USAAF)
base located on Crowell Island. Inuit  call  i t
Mialigaqtaliminiq, ‘the place where the Americans lived.’
Few non-Inuit residents of Iqaluit are aware of this site’s
existence or its significance to area history. Like many
Canadians, they probably assume that the community of
Iqaluit originated as a Hudson’s Bay Company post, as is
the case for most other communities in the Canadian
Arctic. In fact, Iqaluit is a product of the Second World
War and owes its existence to the small cadre of American
servicemen who established an advance base/weather sta-
tion at Crowell Island in October 1941 and subsequently
built an airfield at the head of Frobisher Bay in 1942 – 43.
At the beginning of the Second World War, the United
States and Canada entered into discussions regarding the
defence of the North American continent and, in particu-
lar, of Canada. Already at war with Germany, Canada was
facing the threat of invasion, although the possibility
seemed remote in the minds of some Canadians. The
Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence, estab-
lished in 1940, made a number of ongoing recommenda-
tions to further the mutual defence interests of the two
countries. Mutual agreements notwithstanding, the United
States had no intention of allowing Canada to be invaded
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by a belligerent power. Even before the official outbreak
of hostilities between the British Commonwealth and
Germany—at a time when Hitler’s ambitions had become
obvious to all but a few—President Roosevelt affirmed
American support for the maintenance of Canadian sover-
eignty. In a 1938 speech, Roosevelt declared: “I give you
assurance that the people of the United States will not
stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened
by any other empire” (Dziuban, 1959:3).
Given the advantage of over 60 years’ hindsight, the
idea that Germany and her confederates (which at the time
included the Soviet Union, albeit as a friendly “neutral”)
had any chance of victory over the Allied forces during the
Second World War seems preposterous. Nevertheless, the
outcome of this struggle was not a foregone conclusion
during the early years of the War. By mid 1940, Britain and
its Commonwealth stood alone against Nazi Germany,
whose powerful and largely unopposed armed forces had
already conquered most of Europe and were poised to
cross the English Channel and conquer a besieged Great
Britain. Canada and the United States were concerned that
if Britain were to be invaded and overrun, as some mem-
bers of the Roosevelt administration considered inevita-
ble, Germany might try to gain a foothold on the Western
Atlantic and North American possessions of the van-
quished European nations. Areas of concern included
Iceland, Greenland and, to a lesser extent, Newfoundland
and Labrador. The Americans were keen to ensure that the
Germans would be denied any opportunity to establish a
presence in the Western Atlantic (Dziuban, 1959; Carlson,
1962). After the fall of Denmark in the spring of 1940, the
Americans were particularly worried that the Germans
might use Greenland as a military staging area. The fact
that Greenland was the world’s sole source of commer-
cially available cryolite—a crucial constituent used in the
manufacture of aircraft aluminium—gave the Americans
additional cause for concern (Christie, 1995).
Canadian and U.S. fears were not unfounded: in at least
two documented cases, German troops established manned
weather stations on the east coast of Greenland in 1941 and
1942. The Germans needed information on weather sys-
tems approaching from the west to assist their U-boat
operations in the North Atlantic; hence, the east coast of
Greenland and Arctic North America were ideal locations
for weather stations. Both of these bases were attacked and
captured by American commandos shortly after they were
discovered (Balchen et al., 1944). By 1942, U-boats were
lurking off the North American coast, and by late 1942, they
were sinking ships in the St. Lawrence River. A few of the
U-boat incursions into North American waters were exam-
ples of daring and pluck. One such incursion occurred in
October 1943, when U-537, a Type IX long-range U-boat,
penetrated the North American Arctic and set up an unmanned
weather station at Martin Bay, Labrador, 44 km (24 air
miles) from Port Burwell. Canadian authorities remained
unaware of this station’s existence until 1980, when an
Austrian historian wrote to the Canadian government to
inquire about its fate (J.P. Showell, pers. comm. 1998). A
file on U-537, which can be found at the U-boat Archives
in Cuxhaven, Germany, contains photographs of the armed
U-boat crew on North American soil, grinning for the
camera in the manner of holidaying tourists.
German forays into the western Atlantic were also
cause for concern, but they paled in comparison to the
devastating effects of the Luftwaffe’s daily bombing raids
on Great Britain and the tremendous toll that U-boats were
exacting upon Canadian and British merchant shipping.
Although sympathetic to Britain’s plight and also con-
cerned over U-boat successes against Allied shipping,
Roosevelt was constrained in his efforts to assist Britain
by powerful isolationist elements then prevalent through-
out the United States. Nevertheless, after two years of
hedging, the United States began to quietly assist Great
Britain and her allies in whatever manner it could, short of
an all-out declaration of war. The pragmatic Americans
recognized that, ultimately, North America’s first line of
defence lay in preserving Great Britain’s sovereignty;
therefore, every effort must be made to ensure that she did
not fall to the Nazis.
THE CRIMSON ROUTE
It was against this backdrop that, in early 1941, the
United States, with the Canadian government’s approval,
activated a plan to establish a chain of northern airfields
and weather stations. Their primary purpose was to help
ferry short-range military aircraft from the United States
to Great Britain (under the terms of the U.S. Lend-Lease
Act). These aircraft were needed to bolster the severely
depleted Royal Air Force and to establish a military pres-
ence in what was acknowledged to be a weak link in North
America’s defensive armour. The plan was eventually
formalized under Recommendations 17 (July 1941) and 26
(June 1942) of the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on
Defence (Dziuban, 1959).
By 1941, German submarines reigned supreme in the
North Atlantic. German U-boat men referred to this period
as “the happy time” (Botting, 1979; Showell, 1989). As a
result, many of the short-range military aircraft shipped
from the United States to Britain via the sea lanes ended up
on the bottom of the ocean. The only other option for
transporting these aircraft to Great Britain was to fly them
across the Atlantic; however, their limited flying range
precluded nonstop crossings. Thus, it became imperative
to establish a chain of airfields across the far North that
would allow the planes to “hopscotch” across the Atlantic,
refuelling along the way.
This chain of airfields, initially called the “North East
Staging Route,” also became known as the “Crimson
Project” or “Crimson Route.” It was purportedly named
after the Red Cross, which was responsible for evacuating
wounded soldiers from the European theatre to North
America, along the same route (Main, 1967:178).
CRYSTAL TWO • 65
The Crimson Route, as it was originally proposed, was
to comprise three distinct routes. The eastern route would
commence at Presque Isle, Maine, with airfields located at
Labrador, northern Quebec, Upper Frobisher Bay, the east
and west coasts of Greenland, and Iceland, terminating at
Prestwick, Scotland. The western route would originate at
Great Falls, Montana, with airfields located at Regina, The
Pas, Churchill, Southampton Island, and Upper Frobisher
Bay, where it intersected with the eastern route. The
central route would originate at Detroit, Michigan, with
airfields located at North Bay, Kapuskasing, Moosonee,
Richmond Gulf, and northern Quebec, where it intersected
with the eastern route. When it was finally established, the
Canadian portion of the Crimson Route had been scaled
down from the originally proposed version. It included
newly constructed airfields at The Pas, Churchill, South-
ampton Island, Frobisher Bay, Fort Chimo, Mingan and
Goose Bay (keeping in mind that Labrador was, at the
time, a British possession).
It should be noted that the “Crimson Route,” as the term
was used by the American military, was understood to be
the far northern route that originated in Montana and
passed through northern Canada, Hudson Bay, Baffin
Island, Greenland, and Iceland. The term “North Atlantic
Ferrying” or “Staging Route” instead referred to the route
from Maine through Newfoundland/Labrador, Greenland,
and Iceland (Conn and Fairchild, 1960; Craven and Cate,
1983).
EARLY ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH AN ARCTIC AIR
ROUTE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE
In general, early Arctic flights between America and
Europe fell into two categories. The first sought to demon-
strate the capabilities of aircraft and the advantage of
shorter air routes between the two continents. The second
category supported scientific investigations of Arctic ge-
ography and meteorology as a precursor to establishing
airfields and weather stations. Interest in Arctic routes
increased in the decade that preceded the Second World
War. The United States, England, Germany, Denmark, and
Norway sent expeditions to Greenland or northeastern
Canada to investigate sites en route. Baffin Island, and the
Frobisher Bay area in particular, figured prominently in
many of these investigations. This fact was not overlooked
by the U.S. military when it finally came around to plan-
ning for the Arctic airfields (Dunbar and Greenaway,
1956; K. Greenaway, pers. comm. 2002).
One such effort worth mentioning was undertaken in
1928 by Berk R.J. (“Fish”) Hassell, a well-known, eccen-
tric aviator who would later become the commanding
officer of Crystal Two. Hassell and another American
aviator, Parker D. (“Shorty”) Cramer, attempted to fly to
Europe via northern Canada and Greenland. The two
airmen became lost on approaching Greenland and, run-
ning low on fuel, they found a level area on the Greenland
icecap at the head of a long fjord and made a smooth
landing. Fifteen days later, the pair arrived at Søndre
Strømfjord on foot, near starving. The flight to Europe was
abandoned, and they returned to the United States by ship
with Professor William Hobbs of the University of Michi-
gan, who was gathering meteorological data in the area
(Ellis, 1954).
In 1934, Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh reported on an
aerial survey that he had conducted for Pan American
Airlines to investigate the possibility of finding a commer-
cial air route from America to Europe via Greenland and
Iceland. Lindbergh recommended that before any deci-
sions were made in this regard, a chain of weather stations
be set up along the proposed route to collect meteorologi-
cal data over a period of years. These data would be
examined to assess the feasibility of establishing a com-
mercial air route across the Arctic. Of significance to this
paper, Lindbergh further suggested that “a study of the
weather conditions on Baffin Island would be very inter-
esting” (USAAFWS, 1945:44).
Two other individuals worthy of mention are the afore-
mentioned Professor William Hobbs and Bernt Balchen, a
Norwegian-American polar aviator who had flown Admi-
ral Byrd on the latter’s pioneering flights in Antarctica.
Both Hobbs and Balchen were vociferous proponents of
establishing airfields in Greenland, but for many years,
officials in Washington ignored them. Ironically, Charles
Lindbergh was purportedly less than enthusiastic about
the commercial viability of a trans-Arctic air route and, in
particular, the feasibility of establishing airfields in Green-
land. For a time, Lindbergh’s views prevailed in official
Washington. Eventually, however, through sheer perse-
verance (abetted considerably by the onset of World War
II), Hobbs and Balchen managed to win over a few key
individuals. One was General H.H. Arnold, Commanding
General of the USAAF, who subsequently became one of
their more influential supporters (Carlson, 1962).
The Battle of the Atlantic and the successes of the U-
boats in sinking allied cargo ships provided the impetus
that prompted the Americans to devote more attention to
establishing a northern air route. At this point, the previous
efforts of countless polar aviators and researchers came to
the forefront. President Roosevelt himself was “deeply
concerned” with the development of the project (Forbes,
1953:2).
CRYSTAL ADVANCE BASES
In July 1941, Captain Elliot Roosevelt, an intelligence
officer with the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF)
and son of the president, and Lieutenant (Lt.) Commander
Alexander Forbes, United States Naval Reserve (USNR),
flew the first of a series of reconnaissance missions out of
Argentia, Newfoundland, to locate potential sites for the
Arctic airfields that were to form the links in the northeast-
ern section of the Crimson Route. After conducting a futile
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search along the Labrador Coast, they stopped at North-
west River, where the Grenfell Mission and a Hudson Bay
Company Post were located, to investigate a nearby site
that Forbes had photographed from the air two years ear-
lier. They found that a team of Canadian surveyors had
preceded them by two months. The Canadians, who were
participating in a separate British-led effort to establish a
North Atlantic ferry route, were searching for an alterna-
tive to Gander, where bad weather often restricted flying.
Their team leader, Eric Fry, had already identified what
appeared to be an ideal site for an airfield: an extensive,
sandy plateau along the shore of Goose Bay on the Hamil-
ton River, locally referred to as “Blake’s Berry Patch”
(Christie, 1995:127). Roosevelt and Forbes, after visiting
the site themselves, concurred. Nevertheless, Roosevelt
recommended that the USAAF take over the project be-
cause he felt that the Canadians lacked the proper equip-
ment and manpower to construct an airfield as quickly as
was required (Forbes, 1953:8). Roosevelt’s fears were later
proven to be unfounded: the Canadians completed three
7000-foot (2134 m) gravel runways there by the end of
1941 (Forbes, 1953:41; Dziuban, 1959:184). After depart-
ing Northwest River, Roosevelt and Forbes proceeded to
northern Quebec to select a site for the first far northern
airfield. They chose a site on the west side of the Koksoak
River, 12 km to the south of the Hudson Bay Company post
at Fort Chimo. Potential sites for a base at Frobisher Bay
and one on the northeast coast of Baffin Island were also
identified during subsequent reconnaissance flights to-
wards the end of July 1941 (Dziuban, 1959).
The overall plan called for the construction of seven
airfields and weather stations. Four were to be located in
North America, at Goose Bay, Labrador; Fort Chimo,
Quebec; Frobisher Bay, NWT; and Padloping Island, NWT.
(By 1942, the idea of constructing an airfield at Padloping
Island would be dismissed as impractical.) The other three
would be located in Greenland, at Narsarsuaq,
Angmagssalik (referred to as “Ikatek” in some contempo-
rary documents), and Søndre Strømfjord. To this day the
latter serves as an occasional stopover for international
transpolar flights. The three bases to be located in the
Canadian Arctic were code-named “Crystal One” (Fort
Chimo, now known as Kuujjuak), “Crystal Two” (Frobisher
Bay), and “Crystal Three” (Padloping Island). The bases
in Greenland were code-named “Bluie West 8” (Søndre
Strømfjord, now Kangerlussuaq), “Bluie West 1”
(Narsarsuaq), and Bluie East 2 (Angmagssalik). Goose
Bay was apparently not assigned a code name.
By the time the sites for the Crystal airfields had been
identified, it was too late in the season to begin construc-
tion. Nevertheless, the Americans wanted at least to estab-
lish advance bases/weather stations at the sites in order to
gain a head start on the 1942 construction season and
gather valuable weather data over the autumn, winter, and
spring. In late September 1941, a fully laden U.S. Army
transport vessel, Sicilien, headed north from Halifax ac-
companied by several commercial trawlers, Fabia, Flow,
Cambridge, Lark, Selis, Cormorant, Polarbjorn, and Quest,
which were also carrying cargo, under the overall com-
mand of Lieutenant Colonel Robert W.C. Wimsatt, USAAF.
The intention was to carry the bulk of the supplies as far as
Port Burwell, where the smaller vessels would take on
additional supplies to carry to their respective destina-
tions. After unloading the supplies destined for Crystal
One, on the Koksoak River, Sicilien would then accom-
pany Lark, Selis, and Polarbjorn to the mouth of Frobisher
Bay, unload supplies for Crystal Two, and then rendez-
vous with Cormorant and Quest before proceeding to
Crystal Three.
Dr. Alexander Forbes (Fig. 1), a lieutenant commander
with the United States Naval Reserve Medical Corps, was
asked to accompany the expedition in the dual capacity of
technical advisor and Arctic pilot. Forbes was well quali-
fied for the task. An internationally noted physiologist by
training, he was also a Master Mariner, geographer, elec-
tronics expert, and airplane pilot. During the First World
War, he served with the United States Navy (USN), install-
ing and testing electronic equipment on destroyers. In
1931, at the suggestion of Sir Wilfred Grenfell, he sailed
his 97-foot (30 m) schooner Ramah on an expedition to
map and chart a portion of the Labrador Coast. He returned
to Labrador in 1935, as a relief pilot and photographer, to
take aerial photographs of the region around Cape Chidley.
The convoy reached Port Burwell in early October
1941. Fabia, Cambridge, and Flow, accompanied by
Forbes, were to head south to Fort Chimo to establish
Crystal One under the leadership of Commander Ike
Schlossbach, USN. Sicilien, Cormorant, and Quest were
to sail to northeastern Baffin Island under the command of
Lt. Colonel Wimsatt to establish Crystal Three, which
turned out to be the most eventful and dangerous mission
of all. Lieutenant Commander Charles J. Hubbard, USNR,
who was most familiar with the region, took charge of
Cormorant. With the assistance of a local pilot, who had
been literally pulled out of his sickbed at the mission
hospital in Pangnirtung, he guided the small convoy of
ships to their final destination at Padloping Island (Forbes,
FIG. 1. Captain Robert Bartlett (left) and Lt. Commander Alexander Forbes
(right) on board Morrissey, 1943. Sherman Wengerd Folio/NWT Archives, N-
1987-022:0012. Prince of Wales Heritage Museum, Yellowknife, Northwest
Territories.
CRYSTAL TWO • 67
1953:30). Captain James G.
Dyer, who had just returned from
the Antarctic, was to be the Com-
manding Officer of Crystal
Three over the first winter.
Three supply ships—Polar-
bjorn, Selis, and Lark—were to
sail to Frobisher Bay under the
command of Major John T.
Crowell, USAAF (Fig. 2), and
establish Crystal Two. Crowell,
a Master Mariner with over 15
years of Arctic and Antarctic
sailing experience, was already
familiar with the geography of
Frobisher Bay. In 1926 and 1927,
he had sailed to Labrador, Baffin
tidal range, horrendous weather, and the primitive lightering
equipment, which consisted of two lifeboats lashed to-
gether with rope and timbers, a small landing barge, and
two small motorboats. Even with assistance from an Inuit
family who were already living on the island, it took
several days to ferry all of the gear ashore, as unloading
from ship to shore could be accomplished only at high tide.
Manoeuvring the heavy sections of the prefabricated build-
ings into place proved difficult, but by late October,
Crowell and his crew had three buildings fully erected and
ready for occupation (USAAFWS, 1945).
It was at this juncture that Professor Carlson convinced
Major Crowell to send Bright, Riedl, Beebe, the unnamed
communications man, and Professor Carlson himself back
south with the ships. Private John Pope, one of the army
engineers, volunteered to replace one of the men leaving
the base (Hubbard, 1941). Carlson had forebodings about
the operation and was convinced that to remain was to
invite “annihilation.” He reasoned that, if it became neces-
sary to evacuate the base by air later on during the winter,
it would be much easier to accomplish with fewer men to
rescue (USAAFWS, 1945:17).
Nine men, Crowell included, overwintered on Crowell
Island in 1941 – 42. They must have lived comfortably, if
not in relative luxury. A visit to the site in 1996 revealed
two vintage 5000 watt, gasoline-powered electrical gen-
erators, as well as a number of coal-burning stoves, which
still looked serviceable despite having been exposed to the
elements for over 54 years. The station was equipped with
a phonograph and two dozen records, as well as plenty of
books and games. Each man had his own set of skis and
snowshoes. The planned shipment of beer, however, had
been left behind at the embarkation docks in the south for
lack of cargo space on the supply ships (USAAFWS,
1945:52). Subsequent inspection reports indicated that
“morale at the Crystal Stations was extremely good”
(USAAFWS, 1945:69). Major Crowell, who had a keen
admiration for Inuit, developed a close friendship with
Nakasuk (Fig. 4), the leader of the small family group
camped on the island. Contemporary documents refer to
him as “Paluchi,” a misspelling of “Paulusi” (pronounced
Pa-oo-loo-see), the name given to Nakasuk by the church
FIG. 2. Major Crowell in
Thule Greenland, 1952.
Photo courtesy of Spencer
Apollonio.
Island, and Greenland as Master of the schooners Sachem
and Radio. He had visited Frobisher Bay in 1927, in
command of Donald MacMillan’s well-known New Eng-
land Arctic research vessel, Bowdoin, and again in 1937 as
Master of Gertrude L. Thebaud (Apollonio, 1990; S.
Apollonio, pers. comm. 1999 – 2001).
The Crystal Two party, in addition to Major Crowell,
included Captain Joachim, a physician; Professor William
Carlson, a civilian technical advisor; Private Tony Columbo,
a dog-sled driver with previous experience in Antarctica
under Admiral Richard E. Byrd; Privates Otto Riedl and
Arthur Barrett, both weather observers; Staff Sergeant
Lynwood Bright, an airplane mechanic; Sergeant James
Hicks; Staff Sergeant Leonard Barnes; Private Paul Evans;
Private Ulysses Beebe; a cook referred to only as “Gibbs,”
and another unnamed individual referred to as “a commu-
nications man” (Hubbard, 1941; USAAFWS, 1945:47).
These 13 men were to establish a base at Cape
Rammelsburg, a large promontory on the southwest side
of Frobisher Bay located 37 km (20 nautical miles) south-
west of present-day Iqaluit. This was the site that Captain
Roosevelt had recommended on the basis of his reconnais-
sance flights in the summer of 1941. Until 1942, the only
available charts of the area were based on the limited and
inaccurate mapping undertaken by Charles Francis Hall
between 1860 and 1862. Thus, the party had to rely
primarily upon physical descriptions and aerial photos
passed on by Roosevelt. Unfortunately, after five days of
searching under abysmal weather conditions, the party
was unable to locate and positively identify the site.
Fearing the imminent onset of winter, Crowell and Carlson
decided to set up an advance base where they could over-
winter for the 1941– 42 season. They chose a small island
(now called Crowell Island, Fig. 3), located off the north-
western end of Pugh Island, 15 km (8 nautical miles) south
of Cape Rammelsburg (Hubbard, 1941; Carlson, 1962).
Crowell and his party were assisted by five additional
men drawn from the U.S. Army Engineer Corps, who were
to return with the ships once the base was constructed.
Unloading was made difficult by Frobisher Bay’s 11 m
FIG. 3. Crystal Two Advance Base on Crowell Island, 1943. Photo facing
northeast. Note the large flat areas to the east of the main base, which appear to
be suitable locations for an airstrip. Sherman Wengerd Folio/NWT Archives,
N-1987-022:0040. Prince of Wales Heritage Museum, Yellowknife, Northwest
Territories.
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and the one he went by when with white men (Kilabuk,
pers. comm. 2001). Nakasuk, who supplied Crowell and
his men with wild game and other assistance throughout
the winter of 1941 – 42, also became Crowell’s “guide,
philosopher, friend, factotum and counsellor” (USAAFWS,
1945:69; Forbes, 1953:70).
On 7 December 1941, the Japanese Navy attacked Pearl
Harbor, thereby thrusting the United States into World
War II. Shortly thereafter, a reluctant Germany, in fulfil-
ment of its obligations under the Tripartite Pact, declared
war on the United States. All pretext of American neutral-
ity dissolved overnight.
CONSTRUCTION OF THE CRYSTAL TWO AIRFIELD
Over the winter of 1941 – 42, the Americans continued
planning for the construction of the Arctic airfields. Lt.
Commander Forbes was concerned that all materiel would
have to be transported to the sites by ship. It was therefore
of the utmost importance that the sea approaches to these
sites be properly charted: a sentiment that he conveyed in
a memorandum to the War Department (Fenn, 1969). As a
result of his memorandum, Forbes was assigned the task of
overseeing the hydrographic and mapping surveys of Crys-
tal One and Crystal Two, as well as acting as guide and
Arctic advisor. In early July 1942, Forbes again sailed
north, this time on the two-masted schooner Effie M.
Morrissey, owned and skippered by her Master and New-
foundland’s most famous son, Captain Robert (Bob) Bartlett
(Fig. 1).
Their first destination was Crystal One, where they
were to conduct a hydrographic survey of the Koksoak
River, which Captain Bartlett (1946:602) described as “a
tide-swept, boulder-paved demon.” Once this survey was
set in motion, they were to split into two groups, one of
which, under Forbes’ command, would proceed north to
Frobisher Bay, pick up Major Crowell, and conduct a
reconnaissance of the area to find a suitable location for
the Crystal Two airfield.
Unlike Crystal One, the permanent site for the Crystal
Two airfield had not yet been determined. The site that
Captain Roosevelt had originally chosen (the “Roosevelt
Site’ that Crowell’s party had been unable to reach the
previous autumn) was ruled out by Major Crowell, who
presumably visited the site sometime during the winter of
1941 – 42. He cited the poor anchorage it offered and the
lack of sufficient level ground on which to construct an
airstrip (Forbes, 1953). Commander Hubbard also “strongly
advised against it” (Kadjan, 1942a:2).
Crowell Island was under consideration because of the
4500 feet (1372 m) of level ground immediately east of the
base (refer to Fig. 3). In fact, the feasibility of landing
aircraft at this site had already been demonstrated, first by
Commander Hubbard, who had visited Crystal Two (as
well as the other Crystal bases) in a ski-equipped airplane
during the winter of 1941 – 42, and later by Major Clark
Hosmer of the USAAF Weather Service, who visited the
Crystal Bases in April 1942 (USAAFWS, 1945; Forbes,
1953). The Crowell Island site was discarded, however,
primarily because the length of the potential airstrip was
short of the desired 5000 – 6000 feet (1524 – 1830 m) and
because it was felt that an island would not be an ideal
place to locate an airbase (Kadjan, 1942a; Forbes, 1953).
A more promising site at the head of Frobisher Bay, at
Koojesse Inlet east of the Sylvia Grinnell River (Fig. 5),
was identified by Commander Hubbard during one of his
reconnaissance flights in June 1942. Forbes’ first task was
to verify that the site would be suitable for an airfield; if so,
he was to sound and chart the approaches in preparation for
the arrival of the supply ships.
Morrissey arrived at Crystal Two on 22 July 1942, and
was followed shortly thereafter by the cargo vessel Pola-
ris. It had taken some effort to locate Crowell’s camp, for
all Forbes had to go on were rough descriptions of the area
passed on to him by Lt. Commander Hubbard and radio
messages earlier relayed by Crowell. Like Crowell the
previous autumn, Forbes and company were handicapped
by a lack of reliable and accurate charts. After a brief
search, Forbes managed to find his quarry. Ice in upper
Frobisher Bay precluded the immediate reconnaissance of
Koojesse Inlet, so they used the time to explore and chart
as much of the immediate area as they could. They focused
on Cincinnati Press Channel (Fig. 6), which runs roughly
north to south, with Crowell Island located at its north end.
By the end of July 1942, upper Frobisher Bay was
finally clear of ice, so Morrissey and Polaris proceeded to
Koojesse Inlet. Crowell, Balkin (a construction engineer
with the Al Johnson Construction Company), and Henry
Kadjan (the airport surveyor) wasted no time in commenc-
ing a quick reconnaissance, after which the site was pro-
nounced, in Forbes’ own words: “the place for the airport”
(Forbes, 1953:71). The site fulfilled the basic require-
ments: it was accessible by sea, it offered a good anchor-
age with reasonable foul-weather protection from most
directions, and it had a large, flat open plain on which to
construct an airfield. The land survey crews immediately
went to work, for much had to be done and the season was
already well advanced. Ships’ carpenters were landed and
FIG. 4. Nakasuk in 1943. Sherman Wengerd Folio/NWT Archives, N-1987-
022:0037. Prince of Wales Heritage Museum, Yellowknife, Northwest
Territories.
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began to build quarters for the men. The next few weeks
were devoted to surveying and preparing the site for the
new airbase.
While work on the base was underway, Forbes and
Crowell conducted soundings of the area from Koojesse
Inlet to Cape Vanderbilt. This included the very important
job of trying to locate a suitable deepwater passage through
the Barrier Islands—a group of over two dozen islands that
bisect Frobisher Bay into upper and lower sections—to
facilitate the passage of the cargo ships that were to follow.
Cincinnati Press Channel was initially considered; in fact,
Major Crowell favoured it. Nevertheless, it was discarded
because of a bar that traverses its south end, reducing the
water depth as low as one to two fathoms (2 – 4 m) at low
tide. Forbes therefore began to search for an alternative
channel. The passage that Forbes called “Whaleboat Pas-
sage,” which is now the main shipping channel (Pike-
Resor) into upper Frobisher Bay, was deemed unsuitable
because of shoal water extending some distance offshore.
A deepwater channel was finally located near Frobisher’s
Farthest (Fig. 6), on the eastern side of the Bay, after which
it was sounded and charted by Forbes and his crew.
The cargo ships started arriving in mid-August, which
kept Major Crowell busy with the job of meeting them at
the south end of the Barrier Islands and guiding them into
Koojesse Inlet. In late August, a large convoy of ships
arrived at the site, carrying roughly 200 civilian construc-
tion workers from the Al Johnson Construction Company
as well as tons of materiel, and the work began in earnest.
The project suffered a setback on 27 August, when
Chatham, one of the cargo ships, was sunk by U-517 off
the Labrador Coast. The ship was carrying 6000 tons of
materiel, including construction equipment intended for
use at Crystal One and Crystal Two (Craven and Cate,
1983; Rohwer, 1998).
Forbes continued with the hydrographic survey and
charting program. It is worth noting that many of the
unusual names that still appear on Frobisher Bay charts
can be traced back to Alexander Forbes. These include
“Churchill’s Thumb,” “Alligator Island,” “Pink Lady Is-
land’—Forbes was fond of a beverage by the same name
(Turner, D.S., pers. comm. 2000)—and numerous other
odd-sounding names that seem so out of place in an Arctic
setting, but which nevertheless stuck.
By September 1942, the Koojesse Airbase had devel-
oped into a bustling community. A hospital was built, as
well as living quarters for the workers, a canteen, work-
shops, garages, warehouses, and a small tent city. The
well-paid men amused themselves in their off-hours with
poker games, where large sums of money were won and
lost, and the occasional movie. Heavy equipment moved
FIG. 5. Map of Frobisher Bay, showing location of the Crystal Two airbase. FIG. 6. Map of Cincinnati Press Channel, showing location of the Crystal Two
advance base and the shipping channel through the Barrier Islands.
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about the community as they built roads and, most impor-
tantly, the airfield facilities.
An interesting incident occurred at Crowell Island at the
beginning of September, when one of the men, Tony
Columbo, claimed to have seen a submarine periscope.
Major Crowell immediately dispatched two heavy ma-
chine guns to the site and ordered a blackout. It was later
presumed that Columbo had seen a seal popping its head
above the water, so the state of siege ended peacefully
(Forbes, 1953:86). Nevertheless, some crew members be-
lieved that Columbo might well have seen a submarine (G.
Pomeroy, pers. comm. 2001). Although the idea of a U-
boat penetrating that far into Frobisher Bay seems absurd,
the possibility cannot be entirely ruled out, for U-boats
were regularly operating along the Labrador coast. It is
known, for example, that a German submarine was moni-
toring the progress of the airbase at Narsarsuaq and that the
Germans knew quite a few pertinent details about that base
(Pockock, 1949:266). At the very least, it appears that the
Germans were aware of the Americans’ activities with
respect to constructing airfields in Greenland (Balchen et
al., 1944) and therefore might also have been aware that an
airbase was being constructed at Frobisher Bay.
On 1 October 1942, Lt. Commander Forbes and Major
Crowell departed for Washington. Major Berk Hassell,
USAAF, succeeded Crowell as the commanding officer of
Crystal Two. In mid-October 1942, the Crystal Two base
was officially transferred from Crowell Island to the new
site at Koojesse Inlet, which, prior to the transfer, had been
referred to as “Chaplet” (War Department, 1942;
USAAFWS, 1945:76). Crowell Island continued to be used
as a field base until its final abandonment in September–
October 1943. It appears that around this time, Crystal Two,
a.k.a. “Chaplet,” had been assigned yet another code name:
Izoc (Fig. 7). The origin of this name is unknown, but it is
shown on War Department site maps dated 1943 (War
Department, 1943). “Crystal Two” and “Chaplet,” how-
ever, appear to have been the most commonly used names.
Construction work on the airbase continued throughout
the winter of 1942 – 43. By the end of 1942, two gravel
runways had been laid out: Runway No. 1, a 6000-foot
(1830 m) runway oriented northwest to southeast, and
Runway No. 2, a 5000-foot (1525 m) runway oriented
northeast to southwest. By April 1943, both were opera-
tional, though not fully developed (Wilson, 1943).
Lt. Commander Forbes occupied the winter months with
the onerous task of converting the hundreds of air photo-
graphs and soundings taken during the previous summer
into accurate hydrographic charts. While Forbes had ac-
complished much in the way of obtaining hydrographic
data, it was decided that there was a need to expand on his
initial surveys. A team of Navy hydrographers would be
sent in to conduct detailed soundings and tidal observations
of both the Koksoak River and Frobisher Bay.
Forbes was placed in command of the 1943 survey
program and was provided with a team of five
hydrographers, as well as a group of enlisted men. Two of
the hydrographers, Lieutenant Sherman A. Wengerd, USN,
and Ensign Daniel S. Turner, USN, both geological engi-
neers by profession, made significant contributions to the
success of the survey. As it turned out, both men also
contributed to the recorded history of Iqaluit because they
kept detailed diaries of their activities and observations.
Forbes, Turner, Wengerd, and a small party of enlisted
men arrived at Crystal Two in August 1943, onboard
Morrissey with Captain Bob Bartlett. The men immedi-
ately set to work erecting control point monuments along
the coast in preparation for sounding and charting the
harbour and the surrounding area as far south as Daniel
Island. The hydrographic survey work continued at a
hectic pace throughout the summer, and much was accom-
plished. Forbes and his crew endured many privations
while carrying out their assignment: plagues of mosqui-
toes, violent storms, rain, sleet, snow, injuries and mal-
functioning equipment. Wengerd’s (1943) diary is replete
with stories of how the crew, after spending hours of hard
physical labour (which included hauling 41 kg sacks of
cement) in erecting survey monuments on high promonto-
ries, would return to the area a day or two later, only to find
them blown down or completely destroyed by high winds.
Frobisher Bay’s large tidal range made offloading the
supply ships problematic because the tidal flats at Koojesse
Inlet extend over 1 km from the shore at low-water springs.
This problem was exacerbated by the large boulders that
covered the whole area, which made for a treacherous
approach. A deepwater docking facility was considered;
however, it was decided that it would be easier and more
practical to clear a path across the tidal flats. This would
allow barges and flat-bottomed ships to come in close to
shore on the high tide, beach themselves, and then be
offloaded directly onto waiting trucks at low tide (Forbes,
1953:81). To this day, the same method is used for dis-
charging cargo from supply ships at Iqaluit, but the path-
way must be cleared each summer, for during the
eight-month winter, ice continually picks up large boulders
and deposits them on the previously cleared tidal flats.
Work on the airfield continued at a steady pace. Accord-
ing to D.S. Turner (pers. comm. 2001), extensive blasting
was required to obtain aggregate material for construction
of the runways. The engineers and builders were plagued
by problems related to permafrost. At the time, the Ameri-
cans had very little (if any) experience in working under
such conditions. The Soviets had extensive experience in
the specialized field of construction and engineering in
permafrost regions, but since very little literature on the
subject was available or had been translated into English,
the Americans could not benefit from the Soviets’ experi-
ence (D.S. Turner, pers. comm. 2000). Washouts were
frequent, sometimes resulting in gullies as deep as 5 m
cutting across one or the other of the two runways. Water
would often well up from below the surface, creating
gaping holes that had to be filled with rocks and smoothed
over. Maintaining the runways was a constant battle, but in
the end the U.S. Army prevailed, often through brute
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force. Dan Turner (pers. comm. 2000) described the mili-
tary approach to problems:
If you don’t succeed, then HIT ‘EM AGAIN, HARDER.
In permafrost, that meant dig wider and deeper! STRIP
the surface, haul in fill dirt. Passive remedies were
against their principles...At Crystal One, I saw them
bury a boom crane 2/3 the length of the raised boom,
right in the middle of the runway. The crane had been
brought down there to extract a dozer that had
disappeared in the runway. Only  the exhaust pipe cap
was showing above the muck.
In August, Nakasuk, who continued to work for the
Americans after Major Crowell’s departure, was returned
to Crowell Island with his family and tons of accumulated
gear (Wengerd, 1943; Forbes, 1953). As payment for his
services, the Americans later turned over the Crowell
Island Base to Nakasuk after its abandonment in Septem-
ber–October 1943. Thereafter, it became known to the
Americans as “Paluchi’s Camp” (Turner, 1946).
In October 1943, Forbes, Turner, and Wengerd de-
parted Crystal Two and returned to the United States. The
groundwork had been laid, and the base was well on the
way to completion. The vast store of hydrographic data
and air photos collected over the summer was turned over
to the U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office. Up until the 1950s,
when the Canadian Hydrographic Service conducted its
own surveys to update and expand on the Americans’
work, the U.S. charts were the only ones available for
Frobisher Bay.
By the end of 1943, the airfield (Fig. 7), which included
the two runways—No. 1 (paved) and No. 2 (gravel)—and
a 30 000 sq. ft. (2788 m2) aircraft hangar and control tower,
was fully operational. However, the Americans continued
to experience permafrost-related problems with both run-
ways, which required constant maintenance and repairs
(Cooke, 1999).
Runway No. 2, as originally proposed by Lt. Com-
mander Hubbard and Major Griswold, USAAF, was in-
tended for use as an emergency runway (Kadjan, 1942b).
Later, however, it was found to poorly oriented with
respect to the prevailing northwest winds; moreover, it
was subject to takeoff and landing restrictions imposed by
the surrounding topography. Even as early as April 1943,
it was suspected that Runway No. 2 was not a very
encouraging prospect, although at the time the Americans
continued with its development (Wilson, 1943). A ridge
FIG. 7. Izoc general site plan (1943), showing location of the two runways. National Archives of Canada. R.G. 12, Vol. 1405, File number 5150-31, pt.1. Ottawa.
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122 m high obstructed the northeast approach, making
takeoffs and landings to and from that direction difficult
and sometimes dangerous (Cooke, 1999). Turner (pers.
comm. 2000) recalled that aircraft always had to approach
the runway from the southwest and take off towards the
same direction. Additionally, a rock ridge 6 m high along
the north edge of the runway, about midway along its
length, further limited its use (Cooke, 1999). By mid 1944,
further development on Runway No. 2 had been discontin-
ued, and eventually it was abandoned altogether. The
runway did prove useful, however, as a parking area for
aircraft and vehicles and a storage area for drummed fuel.
THE OPERATIONAL YEARS
Despite all of the effort and money expended in the
urgent construction of the Crimson Route, the changing
circumstances of the war had rendered the far northern
airfields virtually obsolete by the time they were com-
pleted. Thus, they were infrequently used for their intended
purpose. Crystal Two recorded 323 aircraft arrivals for the
year 1943, but few of these went on to Europe (Dziuban,
1959; Cooke, 1999). In fact, very few aircraft made their
way across to Great Britain via the far northern sections of
the Crimson Route (USAAFWS, 1945; Forbes, 1953:135).
By 1944, the U-boat threat had been largely neutralized
by the Allies’ superior anti-submarine warships and new
technological developments, such as advanced sea and
airborne radar units that could pick out a submarine peri-
scope from great distances. Long-range anti-submarine
aircraft had finally closed the so-called “Black Pit”—a
region of the North Atlantic between Labrador and Ice-
land, with the southern tip of Greenland at its mid-point—
where protective air cover had been absent during the first
half of the war. As a result, U-boats started to suffer
catastrophic losses. Conversely, as U-boats were being
driven from the North Atlantic, shipping losses decreased
dramatically. The war had taken an overall turn in favour
of the Allies, so there was no longer a need to ferry aircraft
over a far northern air route.
The demise of the U-boats notwithstanding, attempts at
flying across the Greenland icecap proved to be hazardous
ventures in themselves and resulted in a number of losses
of aircraft and men (Forbes, 1953:135). With rapid ad-
vances in aeronautical engineering, short-range military
aircraft equipped with extra fuel tanks could simply bypass
the Crystal airfields and Søndre Strømfjord, flying from
Goose Bay to Great Britain either directly or via Iceland.
In June 1944, the Canadian Government purchased the
Crimson Route airfields for $31.6 million (United States
currency), $6.8 million of which was expended for Crystal
Two. Canada, becoming increasingly concerned about the
American military presence on Canadian soil, was anxious
to regain control of its northern territories. It was not until
1950, however, that the Canadians actually assumed offi-
cial control of the Crystal Two airfield. Until that time, the
Canadian presence at Crystal Two had apparently con-
sisted of two people. The first, Constable Verlin H.
Marchbank of the RCMP, was there in 1944; the second, a
liaison officer of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF),
arrived in 1947 (Cooke [E.F.], 1944; Cooke [O.], 1999).
The Americans continued to occupy Crystal Two, albeit
with the consent of the Canadian government, to operate
the weather station and maintain the runway. The United
States still believed the airbase had strategic value, par-
ticularly after 1945, with the onset of the Cold War.
In some quarters, the Crimson Route airfields were
viewed as a colossal waste of money, even more so be-
cause Canada ended up purchasing them from the Ameri-
cans. Malcolm MacDonald, High Commissioner for the
United Kingdom in Canada, was taken on a flying tour of
the airfields during the summer of 1944 and wrote a
fascinating report based on his observations. MacDonald’s
sentiments were blunt and derisive:
I rather think that the Americans have added to the schools
of White Whales, families of White Bears and thousands
of White Foxes...a fine little herd of White Elephants....the
Canadians are literally going to pay for the Americans’
mistakes. (Grant, 1988:277)
History has demonstrated that MacDonald had been
rather hasty in his judgment, at least inasmuch as the far
northern bases along the Crimson Route were concerned.
While they were seldom used for their intended role, they
nevertheless retained their importance and utility in the
capacity of meteorological stations, which assisted the
war effort through improved weather forecasting for the
North Atlantic shipping lanes and, to a lesser extent, as
secondary military airfields (USAAFWS, 1945). Further-
more, the concerted efforts that went into the mapping,
hydrographic surveying, and aerial photography of the
airfields and the surrounding areas significantly expanded
the knowledge of Canadian Arctic geography.
The Crimson Route airfields and their support facilities
were excellent examples of mid-20th century technology
and American audacity. Malcolm MacDonald’s observa-
tions and impressions of the airfields are illustrative:
...the air bases...are striking examples of the American
nation’s magnificent impertinence, imaginativeness,
energy, mechanical skill, and extravagance. I do not use
the word “impertinence” only because, I understand, their
army authorities started these works on Canadian territory
without properly informing or consulting the Canadian
government. It is also because they treated with similar
indifference the obstacles which Nature—whose
sovereignty in the Arctic is even more supreme than that
of the Canadian Government—put in their way. (Grant,
1988:275)
MacDonald describes the facilities at Crystal Two:
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Here the Americans have built what is in effect a small
town. The present population is about 100 officers and
men but there is accommodation for eight times that
number. I stayed at the Commanding Officer’s house....It
has...wash basins...a shower...running hot and cold
water...a lounge with a well stocked bar.
Besides the runways…there are various establishments in
the station.…barracks, mess-rooms and kitchens; a twenty-
five bed hospital with a completely up-to-date operating
room, X-Ray department and dentist’s quarters; a shop
and coffee-house; a theatre...a laundry; a barber’s shop
and Turkish bath-house.…every item of food or drink that
a “super” ice-cream machine and soda-fountain
respectively can concoct.…A new program of films is
shown in the theatre three times a week. Sometimes the
latest feature films from Hollywood can be seen in the
Arctic wastes before they are seen in New York or
Chicago. (Grant, 1988:275 –276)
POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT
Crystal Two, which became known as Frobisher Bay
shortly after the end of the war, was renamed Iqaluit in
1987. The community continued to undergo many trans-
formations, at a steady pace, which will be discussed only
briefly in this paper, for a book could be written about all
of the interesting events and fascinating characters that
contributed to its postwar evolution.
In 1947, the Americans returned in strength (400 per-
sonnel) to refurbish Runway No. 1. In 1948, the Hudson’s
Bay Company moved its trading post from nearby Ward
Inlet to what is now known as “Apex,” just a few miles
southeast along the coast from the airfield. The RCAF
officially took control of the airfield in September 1950.
Between 1951 and 1958, as a result of the Cold War, the
Americans returned to Frobisher Bay in several waves.
First came the Northeast Air Command of the United States
Air Force (USAF; the United States Army Air Forces
became known as the United States Air Force as of 1947)
and later, the Strategic Air Command. At the time, major
programs were underway at the Thule Air Base in Green-
land, including the joint American-Canadian Distant Early
Warning (DEW Line) Radar Sites, closely followed by the
Ballistic Missile Early Warning Site (BMEWS). Once
again, the Americans had essentially reassumed control of
the airfield by operating the air traffic control system that
extended southward from Thule to Newfoundland. They
continued to operate it into the next decade.
Frobisher Bay now functioned as a resupply and distri-
bution centre. Concurrently, between 1951 and 1953, a
radar station was constructed on a prominent hill northeast
of Runway No. 1. Commonly referred to as “Upper Base,”
it was built as a part of the “Pinetree Line,” a string of long-
range search radar installations that spanned the entire
length of southern Canada and arced northwards along the
Newfoundland-Labrador coast, terminating at Frobisher
Bay. The Pinetree Line, which preceded the better-known
DEW Line by five years, was entirely manned; each
individual site had the capability to direct jet interceptors
against enemy aircraft (R. L’Ecuyer, pers. comm. 2002).
In 1953, the Royal Canadian Navy established a high-
frequency radio direction-finding (HF/DF or “Huff Duff”)
station on the west side of Runway No. 1. In 1954, the
Americans began blasting away a rock ridge—which had
long been considered a hazard to air navigation—located
several hundred metres off the northwest end of Runway
No. 1. By 1960, the runway had been completely rebuilt
(using the crushed rock from the removal of that ridge),
lengthened from 6000 to 9000 feet (1830 to 2744 m), and
re-surfaced with a new coat of asphalt (Cooke, 1999).
In 1955, the Americans constructed a communication
facility, code-named “Polevault,” at Upper Base. It was to
serve as a link between the DEW Line sites to the north,
then under planning and construction, and the communica-
tions centres to the south. During that same period, the
Canadian government established a more significant pres-
ence in the area with a Department of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development regional headquarters and con-
structed a civilian town site at Apex. By 1957, the popula-
tion of Frobisher Bay had reached 1200 (Advisory
Commission on the Development of Government in the
Northwest Territories, 1966).
In 1956, the Americans requested permission from the
Canadian government to establish a Strategic Air Com-
mand (SAC) base at Frobisher Bay, where they could
station a squadron of KC-97 mid-air refuelling tankers.
These in turn would support SAC’s B-47 nuclear bombers.
Permission was granted, and construction of the base
began in 1958.
Operation of the airfield was transferred late in 1957
from the RCAF to the (Canadian) Department of Transport
(DOT), who would operate it as a civilian airport. The
transfer does not appear to have affected the activities of
the Americans, who retained a contingent of men to oper-
ate Upper Base and the SAC base, then under construction.
In fact, the USAF was still the greatest user of the airfield
(Cooke, 1999).
In 1961, the Pinetree Line radar station was closed, but
the Polevault facility remained operational. After the in-
troduction of long-range B-52 bombers (and the accompa-
nying KC-135 tankers) in 1962, there was no longer a need
for stationing mid-air refuelling tankers at Frobisher Bay.
The SAC facility was closed in early July 1963, by which
time at least seven KC-97 air tankers were permanently
stationed there. By October 1963, the Americans had
transferred responsibility for maintaining Polevault to the
Department of Transport, and they subsequently departed
Frobisher Bay (Cooke, 1999). The community continued
to evolve and grow, finally becoming the capital of the new
territory of Nunavut in 1999. As of 2002, the population
has reached 5100 and is projected to increase to over 8300
by the year 2020 (Government of Nunavut, 2000).
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Iqaluit’s airfield—the largest in the Canadian Arctic,
with the longest runway—serves as a refuelling and emer-
gency landing facility for both domestic and international
flights. When DC-6-type aircraft were introduced to inter-
continental air routes, these aircraft, on flights between
Europe and the west coast of North America, began stop-
ping at Frobisher Bay to refuel. During this period, plan-
ners had visions of Frobisher Bay’s becoming a major
international airport, with improved hangar facilities and
large hotels. Such plans were dropped after the introduc-
tion of the long-range Boeing 707, since these large pas-
senger aircraft no longer needed to refuel at Frobisher Bay
(K. Greenaway, pers. comm. 2001).
The last vestiges of Iqaluit’s wartime origins are slowly
disappearing. The extreme northeast end of Runway No.
2—which, some evidence suggests, might have been the
first runway to be constructed at Frobisher Bay (Pederson,
1958)—is now occupied by the current airport terminal
building and parking lot. The southwest end of it is still
discernible, but it is slowly being built over. It no longer
resembles a runway, but looks more like a wide gravel
road. The Canadian military, in a joint effort with the
United States, constructed a North Warning System Logis-
tics Support Base (as part of a larger network of modern-
ized radar installations that replaced the DEW Line) on the
site in 1993. More recently, local people have been con-
structing shacks and dog pens a short distance to the
southwest. One can still find remnants of the 1940s era in
the form of old vehicles and other assorted metal debris in
an old dump site just beyond the southwest end of Runway
No. 2. The Crystal Two advance base at Crowell Island has
been reduced to a field of scattered and mostly unrecogniz-
able debris, although Crowell Island itself is still used as
a seasonal camp site by Inuit hunters and their families.
At least one building left in Iqaluit can trace its origins
to the Second World War: the original aircraft hangar,
built in 1943, which served as Frobisher Bay’s airport
terminal until it was replaced by a more modern facility in
1985 – 86. Shortly thereafter, it was purchased by First Air
for use as an office and cargo shed. First Air recently
renovated the hangar, which bodes well for its future as a
preserved historic landmark. Unfortunately, the control
tower had to be demolished.
CLOSING REMARKS
Iqaluit is projected to experience rapid growth over the
next several years. As more people move into the area, an
increasingly smaller percentage of Iqaluit residents will
know or appreciate the historical events that led to the
creation of what is rapidly becoming a major Arctic centre
(Fig. 8a, b). Currently, there are no plaques or monuments
that commemorate Iqaluit’s wartime origins, despite the
fact that Iqaluit owes its existence to the Second World
War. Tourism publications make only passing reference to
the war years, and most of them contain factual errors. No
doubt this contributes to the lack of historical conscious-
ness on the part of most residents.
2002 – 2003 marks the 60th anniversary of the airfield at
Iqaluit. It is hoped that this paper will generate an interest
in Iqaluit’s Second World War origins, thus keeping this
history alive. It is a regrettable fact that the names of the
American servicemen, who were in a sense the founding
fathers of Iqaluit, remain unknown to the majority of
residents and visitors. Their names and their deeds should
not be consigned to anonymity.
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